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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games that arise from production-inventory prob-
lems. Several agents have to cover their demand over a finite time horizon and shortages are allowed. Each
agent has its own unit production, inventory-holding and backlogging cost. Cooperation among agents is
given by sharing production processes and warehouse facilities: agents in a coalition produce with the
cheapest production cost and store with the cheapest inventory cost. We prove that the resulting cooperative
game is totally balanced and the Owen set reduces to a singleton: the Owen point. Based on this type of
allocation we find a population monotonic allocation scheme for this class of games. Finally, we point out
the relationship of the Owen point with other well-known allocation rules such as the nucleolus and the
Shapley value.
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1. Introduction
One of the main objectives of management of firms is cost reduction. In order to achieve
this goal, groups of firms might form coalitions to diminish operation costs making dynamic
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2 L.A. Guardiola et al. / Games and Economic Behavior ••• (••••) •••–•••decisions throughout a finite planning horizon. In tactical planning of enterprises which produce
indivisible goods, operation costs mainly consist of production, inventory-holding, and back-
logging costs. These coalitions should induce individual and collective cost reductions; thus,
stability is achieved in the process of enterprise cooperation.
In our framework a coalition allows each of its members of have access to the technologies
owned by the other members of the coalition. Thus, members of a coalition can use the lowest-
cost technology of the firms in the coalition. Planning is done throughout a finite time horizon;
therefore, at the beginning of each period, the costs to the members of a coalition, which depend
on the best technology at that point, may change.
The model that represents that situation is the dynamic, discrete, finite planning horizon
production-inventory problem with backlogging. The objective of any group of firms is to satisfy
the demand for indivisible goods in each period at a minimum cost. This is a well-known com-
binatorial optimization problem for which the algorithm by Wagner and Whitin (1958) provides
optimal solutions by dynamic programming techniques. The optimal solutions of this problem
lead to the best production-inventory policy for the group of firms. These policies generate an
optimal operation cost for the entire group. The question is what portion of this cost is to be
supported by each firm. Cooperative game theory provides the natural tools for answering this
question.
The analysis of inventory situations is not new. Thus, one can find in the literature several
centralization inventory models approached from this point of view. The interested reader is
referred to Eppen (1979), Kohli and Park (1989), Gerchak and Gupta (1991), Robinson (1993),
Hartman and Dror (2003, 2005, 1996), Hartman et al. (2000), Anupindi et al. (2001), Müller
et al. (2002), Meca et al. (2003, 2004), Meca (2007), Minner (2007), Tijs et al. (2005) and
Slikker et al. (2005) among others, for comprehensive literature on this subject. Other operations
research games are studied as well. For a clear and detailed presentation of operations research
games (including inventory games) we refer to Borm et al. (2001). We are not aware of any
reference in the literature of centralization in inventory models that analyzes inventory models
for which optimal operation is only defined implicitly as the optimal solution of a combinatorial
problem (as it is the case in the discrete review model in this paper). In this regards, our approach
makes a step forward.
The study of cooperative combinatorial optimization games, which are defined through char-
acteristic functions given as optimal values of combinatorial optimization problems, is a fruitful
topic (see, for instance, Shapley and Shubik, 1972; Dubey and Shapley, 1984; Granot, 1986;
Tamir, 1992; Deng et al., 1999, 2000; Faigle and Kern, 2000). There are characterizations of the
total balancedness of several classes of these games. Inventory games and combinatorial opti-
mization games are up to date disjoint classes of games. While in the former class there is always
an explicit form for the characteristic function of each game, the characteristic function of the
games in the latter class it is defined implicitly as the optimal value of an optimization problem
in integer variables.
In this paper we introduce a class of production-inventory games which combine the char-
acteristics of inventory and combinatorial optimization games: this class models cooperation on
production and storage of indivisible goods and its characteristic function is defined implicitly
as the optimal value of a combinatorial optimization problem. It turns out to be a new class of
totally balanced combinatorial optimization games.
We start by introducing definitions and notations in Section 2. In Section 3 we give a complete
description of the production-inventory problem (PI-problem). A natural variant of this problem
is addressed in Section 4. Several agents, each one facing a PI-problem, decide to cooperate toPlease cite this article in press as: L.A. Guardiola et al., Production-inventory games: A new class of totally balanced
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situation, the corresponding cooperative game structure, namely production-inventory game (PI-
game), is defined. The main results (total balancedness and an explicit form for the characteristic
function) are stated in this section. Section 5 completes the study of PI-games by showing that
the Owen set of a PI-situation (the set of allocations that are achievable through dual solutions)
shrinks to a singleton: the Owen point. Its explicit form is also provided, and moreover, it is
proved that the Owen point can be reached through a population monotonic allocation scheme.
In addition, a necessary and sufficient condition for the core of a PI-game to be a singleton: the
Owen point, is presented. We propose the Owen point as a core-allocation for a PI-game which is
easy to calculate and satisfies good properties. Finally, we point out the relationship of the Owen
point with some well-known point solutions in cooperative game theory.
2. Preliminaries
Production-inventory games constitute a class of cooperative cost games with transferable
utility (TU games). A TU cost game is a pair (N, c), where N = {1,2, . . . , n} is the finite player
set and c :P(N) → R the characteristic function satisfying c(∅) = 0. The subgame related to
coalition S, cS, is the restriction of the mapping c to the subcoalitions of S. We denote by
lower case letter s the cardinality of set S, i.e. card(S) = s, for all S ⊆ N. A cost-sharing vector
will be x ∈ Rn and, for every coalition S ⊆ N we shall write x(S) :=∑i∈S xi the cost-sharing
to coalition S (where x(∅) = 0). The core of the game (N, c) consists of those cost-sharing
vectors which allocate the cost of the grand coalition in such a way that every other coalition
pays at most its cost, given by the characteristic function: Core(N, c) = {x ∈ Rn/x(N) = c(N)
and x(S) c(S) for all S ⊂ N}. In the following, cost-sharing vectors belonging to the core will
be called core-allocations. A cost game (N, c) has a nonempty core if and only if it is balanced
(see Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967). It is a totally balanced game if the core of every subgame
is nonempty. Totally balanced games were introduced by Shapley and Shubik in the study of
market games (see Shapley and Shubik, 1969).
A population monotonic allocation scheme (see Sprumont, 1990), or pmas, for the game
(N, c) is a collection of vectors yS ∈ Rs for all S ⊆ N,S = ∅ such that yS(S) = c(S) for all
S ⊆ N,S = ∅, and ySi  yTi for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N and i ∈ S. Note that if (yS)∅=S⊆N is a pmas
for (N, c), then yS ∈ Core(N, cS) for all S ⊆ N,S = ∅. Hence, the set of payoff vectors that
can be reached through a pmas can be seen as a refinement of the core. Every cost game with
pmas is totally balanced. However, it is not possible to get a pmas with any random selection
of cost-sharings and there are totally balanced cost games without pmas. A core-allocation for
(N, c), denoted by x ∈ Core(N, c), is reached through a pmas if there exists (yS)∅=S⊆N for the
game (N, c) such that yNi = xi for all i ∈ N.
A game is said to be subadditive when for all disjoint coalitions S and T , c(S ∪ T ) c(S) +
c(T ) holds. In a subadditive game, it will always be beneficial for two disjoint coalitions to
cooperate and form a larger coalition. Balanced cost games might not be subadditive but they
always satisfy subadditive inequalities involving the grand coalition. However, totally balanced
cost games are subadditive. A well-known class of balanced and subadditive games is the class
of concave games (see Shapley, 1971).
Finally to simplify the presentation, for a generic problem (P ) we will denote in the following
by val(P ), F(P ) and O(P ), the optimal value, the set of feasible solutions and the set of optimal
solutions of problem (P ), respectively.Please cite this article in press as: L.A. Guardiola et al., Production-inventory games: A new class of totally balanced
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To start with, the basic form of the production-inventory model is now described (the inter-
ested reader is referred to Johnson and Montgomery, 1974 for further details). Demand for a
single product occurs during each of T consecutive time periods that are numbered 1 through T .
The demand that occurs during a given period can be satisfied by production during that period,
during any earlier period (as inventory is carried forward) or can be backlogged to be covered
by production at future periods (as backlogged demand is accumulated). Inventory at period 1 is
zero, and inventory at the end of period T is required to be zero. The model includes production,
inventory and backlogging costs. The objective is to schedule production so as to satisfy demand
at minimum cost. Formally, a production-inventory problem (PI-problem for short) is a 5-tuple
(T , d,h, b,p) where:
• T is the planning horizon.
• d = (d1, . . . , dT ) 0, dt = demand during period t , t = 1, . . . , T .
• h = (h1, . . . , hT ) 0, ht = unit inventory carrying costs in period t , t = 1, . . . , T .
• b = (b1, . . . , bT ) 0, bt = unit backlogging carrying costs in period t , t = 1, . . . , T .
• p = (p1, . . . , pT ) 0, pt = unit production costs in period t , t = 1, . . . , T .
The decision variables of the model are:
• qt = production during period t .
• It = inventory at hand at the end of period t .
• Et = backlogged demand at the end of period t .
The reader may notice that I and E variables are instrumental and help to clarify presentation
while q is the only actual set of decision variables. (Once q is known the others can be obtained
solving a system of linear equations.) These decision variables are required to be in integer
quantities. The resolution amounts to the following mathematical programming formulation:
(PI) min
T∑
t=1
(ptqt + htIt + btEt )
s.t. I0 = IT = E0 = ET = 0, (1)
It − Et = It−1 − Et−1 + qt − dt , t = 1, . . . , T , (2)
qt , It ,Et , nonnegative, integer, t = 1 . . . , T . (3)
Constraint (1) ensures initial and final conditions on inventory and backlogged demand. Mat-
ter is conserved, and (2) requires that the sum of the inventory at the end of a period is the sum
of the inventory at the end of previous period minus consumption. Finally, constraint (3) ensures
nonnegativity and integrality of the variables in the problem.
We associate with problem (PI) its linear relaxation (LPI). This problem turns out to be
(LPI) min
T∑
t=1
(ptqt + htIt + btEt )
s.t. I0 = IT = E0 = ET = 0, (4)
It − Et = It−1 − Et−1 + qt − dt , t = 1, . . . , T , (5)
qt  0, It  0, Et  0, t = 1, . . . , T . (6)Please cite this article in press as: L.A. Guardiola et al., Production-inventory games: A new class of totally balanced
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the feasible region of (LPI) are integers. Indeed, the constraint matrix of problem (LPI) is a 0,
±1 valued matrix where each column has at most one +1 and at most one −1, then it is totally
unimodular and the result is well known (see, e.g., Garfinkel and Nemhauser, 1972).
Let (DLPI) be the dual of (LPI). This problem is given as
(DLPI) max
T∑
t=1
ytdt (7)
s.t. yt  pt , t = 1, . . . , T , (8)
yt+1 − yt  ht , t = 1, . . . , T − 1, (9)
−yt+1 + yt  bt , t = 1, . . . , T − 1. (10)
The consequence of the above discussion is that
val(PI) = val(LPI) = val(DLPI).
Moreover, problems (PI) and (LPI) have integer optimal solutions.
Let
hkt =
t−1∑
r=k
hr for any k < t, t = 2, . . . , T , hk1 = 0, k < 1, (11)
btk =
k−1∑
r=t
br , for any k > t, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, bT k = 0, k > T . (12)
According to this notation one can check that a feasible solution for (DLPI) is given as
y∗t = min
{
pt ,min
k<t
{pk + hkt },min
k>t
{pk + btk}
}
, t = 1, . . . , T , (13)
where
pk =
{
p1 if k < 1,
pT if k > T .
The reader may notice that this solution induces a feasible solution in the primal problem.
In this solution the demand dt that occurs in period t is produced according to the following
scheme:⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
in period t if y∗t = pt ,
in period kh if y∗t = pkh + hkht , kh < t ,
in period kb if y∗t = pkb + btkb , kb > t .
Lemma 3.1. The vector y∗ given in (13) is an optimal solution of problem (DLPI).
Proof. The reader can easily check that y∗ satisfies all the constraints of problem (DLPI). This
solution induces a feasible production plan (q∗, I ∗,E∗) in the primal problem (PI) so that∑T
t=1(ptq∗t + htI ∗t + btE∗t ) =
∑T
t=1 dty∗t . Therefore, both solutions are optimal in their cor-
responding problems. 
The reader may notice that if it were assumed that all the unit costs h, b and p are nonnegative
integers then the solution y∗ would also be an integer. Moreover, we would like to have morePlease cite this article in press as: L.A. Guardiola et al., Production-inventory games: A new class of totally balanced
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the optimal solution y∗ given by (13) is the componentwise upper bound of any optimal solution
of (DLPI). Hence, it is called maximal optimal solution for (DLPI).
The following technical lemma will be useful to prove the theorem. In fact, it reveals that
vector y∗ is the componentwise maximum of all feasible solutions. Recall that by F(DLPI) we
denote the feasible solution set for (DLPI).
Lemma 3.2. For each y ∈ F(DLPI), yt  y∗t for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T }.
Proof. Take y ∈ F(DLPI). Let pkh +hkht = mink<t {pk+hkt } and pkb +btkb = mink>t {pk+btk},
t = 1, . . . , T .
For any t ∈ {1, . . . , T } we can distinguish three situations:
(S1) pt  pkh + hkht and pt  pkb + hkbt . Then, y∗t = pt , and by (8) yt  y∗t .
(S2) pkh + hkht < pt and pkh + hkht  pkb + btkb . Then, y∗t = hkht + pkh.
Taking into account that
ykh  pkh,
ykh+1  hkh + ykh,
ykh+2  hkh+1 + ykh+1  hkh+1 + (hkh + pkh) = hkhkh+2 + pkh,
...
yt  ht−1 + yt−1  ht−1 + (hkht−1 + pkh) = hkht + pkh
we conclude that yt  y∗t .
(S3) pkb + btkb < pt and pkb + btkb < pkh + hkht . Then, y∗t = btkb + pkb ; and
ykb  pkb ,
ykb−1  bkb−1 + ykb ,
ykb−2  bkb−2 + ykb−1  bkb−2 + (bkb−1 + pkb) = bkb−2kb + pkb ,
...
yt  bt + yt+1  bt + (bt+1kb + pkb) = btkb + pkb .
Hence, yt  y∗t . 
Theorem 3.3. The optimal solution set of problem (DLPI) is given by
O(DLPI) =
{
y ∈ F(DLPI); yt  y
∗
t if dt = 0
yt = y∗t if dt > 0
}
.
Proof. (⊆) Take y ∈ O(DLPI). By Lemma 3.2, yt  y∗t for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T }. Suppose there
exists a period t ∈ {1, . . . , T } with dt > 0 and yt < y∗t . Then by Lemma 3.1, val(DLPI) = y∗1d1 +· · · + y∗dT > y1d1 + · · · + yT dT , which is a contradiction.
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T∑
t=1
dtyt =
T∑
t=1
dt>0
dty
∗
t =
T∑
t=1
dty
∗
t .
Hence by duality theorem in linear programming, we can conclude that y ∈ O(DLPI). 
4. Production-inventory games
Once we have revisited the classical version of the production-inventory problem, we ad-
dress a natural variant of this problem in which several agents, each one facing a PI-problem,
decide to cooperate to reduce costs. Here the cooperation is driven by sharing technologies in
production, inventory carrying and backlogged demand. Thus, if a group of agents agree on
cooperation then at each period they will produce and pay inventory carrying and backlogged
demand at the cheapest costs among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in holding and
production costs is usual and has appeared already in literature. Our mode of cooperation in
backlogging is also natural: once a coalition is formed, all its members pay compensation to
customers for delayed delivering (backlogging cost) of their demands according to the cheap-
est cost among the members in the coalition. In some regards, larger coalitions are stronger and
“squeeze” a bit more their clients. Formally, a production-inventory situation (PI-situation) is
a 5-tuple (N,D,H,B,P ) where N is the set of players N = {1, . . . , n} and for each player i
(T , di, hi, bi,pi) is a PI-problem.
The reader may notice that
D = [d1, . . . , dn]′, H = [h1, . . . , hn]′,
B = [b1, . . . , bn]′, P = [p1, . . . , pn]′;
and
di = [di1, . . . , diT ]′, hi = [hi1, . . . , hiT ]′,
bi = [bi1, . . . , biT ]′, pi = [pi1, . . . , piT ]′.
Note that we can associate with each PI-situation (N,D,H,B,P ) a cost TU-game (N, c)
with characteristic function c defined as follows: c(∅) = 0 and for any S ⊆ N , c(S) =
val(LPI(S)), where
(LPI(S)) min
T∑
t=1
(
pSt qt + hSt It + bSt Et
)
s.t. I0 = IT = E0 = ET = 0,
It − Et = It−1 − Et−1 + qt − dSt , t = 1, . . . , T ,
qt  0, It  0, Et  0, t = 1, . . . , T ;
with
pSt = min
i∈S
{
pit
}
, hSt = min
i∈S
{
hit
}
, bSt = min
i∈S
{
bit
}
, dSt =
∑
i∈S
dit .
Every cost TU-game defined in this way is what we call a production-inventory game (PI-
game).
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Theorem 4.1. Let (N,D,H,B,P ) be a PI-situation with D being an integer matrix. The corre-
sponding PI-game (N, c) is totally balanced.
Proof. For any S ⊆ N consider the reduced game (S, cS).
Let y∗ be an optimal solution of (DLPI(S)). Define u∗ = (y∗′di)i∈S ∈Rs . It is clear that
∑
i∈S
u∗i =
T∑
t=1
y∗t dSt = val
(
DLPI(S)
)= val(LPI(S))= cS(S).
Moreover, for any R ⊆ S,y∗ is a feasible solution for (DLPI(R)) since the constraint matrix does
not depend on S and the right-hand side of (DLPI(S)) is componentwise smaller than or equal
to the one of (DLPI(R)). Hence,
cS(R) = val
(
DLPI(R)
)= max
y∈F(DLPI(R))
T∑
t=1
dRt yt 
T∑
t=1
dRt y
∗
t =
∑
i∈R
y∗′di =
∑
i∈R
u∗i .
Therefore, Core(S, cS) = ∅. 
We note in passing that although PI-games are totally balanced games, in general these games
are not concave (see Example 4.4).
Recently, Deng et al. (1999, 2000) have studied some families of combinatorial optimization
games, namely packing and covering games, for which they prove total balancedness. Here, we
have presented a different class exhibiting the same property. The core of the above mentioned
classes of combinatorial optimization games coincides with the set of dual solutions, i.e. optimal
solutions of the dual problem to the one that defines the characteristic function. However, the
same property does not hold in our class of PI-games as will be shown in the next examples. In
order to study the core set within the class of PI-games we introduce the so-called Owen set: the
set of allocations that are achievable through dual solutions (see Gellekom et al., 2000). Formally,
the Owen set of (N,D,H,B,P ) is defined by
Owen(N,D,H,B,P ) = {(y′di)
i∈N : y ∈ O
(
DLPI(N)
)}
. (14)
As a straightforward consequence of Theorem 4.1, we obtain that
Owen(N,D,H,B,P ) ⊆ Core(N, c).
Our next example shows that in general there are core-allocations not achieved with dual
solutions.
Example 4.2. Consider the following PI-situation with two periods and two players, namely P1
and P2:
Demand Production Inventory Backlogging
P1 10 10 2 2 1 2 1 2
P2 8 12 1 1 2 4 2 2
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S
2 p
S
1 p
S
2 h
S
1 h
S
2 b
S
1 b
S
2 c
{1} 10 10 2 2 1 2 1 2 40
{2} 8 12 1 1 2 4 2 2 20
{1,2} 18 22 1 1 1 2 1 2 40
The unique optimal solution of (DLPI({1,2})) is y∗′ = (1,1). This gives Owen(N,D,H,
B,P ) = {(20,20)}. However, Core(N, c) = {(x1, x2): 0 x1  40, 0 x2  20, x1 + x2 = 40}.
In order to get the Owen set one has to solve three optimization problems (DLPI({1,2})),
(DLPI({1})) and (DLPI({2})). In general, for a n-player game 2n − 1 optimization problems
would have had to be solved.
For the sake of simplicity, we obtain an explicit form for the characteristic function of PI-
games.
Consider (DLPI(S)) the dual of (LPI(S)). Recall that the problem (DLPI(S)) is defined as
(DLPI) (see (7)–(10)) where cost coefficients and right-hand side vector are replaced by pS , hS
and bS , and dS , respectively.
Let us denote
hSkt =
t−1∑
r=k
hSr for any k < t, t = 2, . . . , T , hSk1 = 0, k < 1, (15)
bStk =
k−1∑
r=t
bSr for any k > t, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, bST k = 0, k > T . (16)
Similar arguments to the ones given in Section 3 show that for all S ⊆ N,S = ∅, the optimal
solution set of problem (DLPI(S)) is
O
(
DLPI(S)
)= { y(S) ∈ F (DLPI(S)); yt (S) y∗t (S) if dSt = 0
yt (S) = y∗t (S) if dSt > 0
}
,
where y∗(S), the maximal optimal solution, is now given by
y∗t (S) = min
{
pSt ,min
k<t
{
pSk + hSkt
}
,min
k>t
{
pSk + bStk
}}
, t = 1, . . . , T , (17)
with
pSk =
{
pS1 if k < 1,
pST if k > T .
Let
pSkh + hSkht = mink<t
{
pSk + hSkt
}
, pSkb + bStkb = mink>t
{
pSk + bStk
}
, t = 1, . . . , T ,
and
H1(S) =
{
t ∈ {1, . . . , T }/pSt  pSkh + hSkht and pSt  pSkb + bStkb},
H2(S) =
{
t ∈ {2, . . . , T }/pSkh + hSkht < pSt and pSkh + hSkht  pSkb + bStkb},
H3(S) =
{
t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}/pSkb + bStkb < pSt and pSkb + bStkb < pSkh + hSkht}.
Remark that {H1(S),H2(S),H3(S)} is a partition of the planning horizon set {1, . . . , T }. Ac-
cording to this notation, it can be checked that an explicit form for the characteristic function of
a PI-game is given by (18).
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(N, c) the corresponding PI-game. Then, for each S ⊆ N , S = ∅
c(S) =
∑
t∈H1(S)
pSt d
S
t +
∑
t∈H2(S)
dSt
(
pSkh + hSkht
)+ ∑
t∈H3(S)
dSt
(
pSkb + bStkb
)
. (18)
Proof. Taking into account that for any S ⊆ N , c(S) = val(DLPI(S)) and y∗(S) ∈ O(DLPI(S)),
we obtain c(S) =∑Tt=1 y∗t (S)dSt . Hence, (18) holds. 
The explicit form above turns out to be expectable. It means that if we are in a period in
which production costs are less than production-inventory carrying and production-backlogging
carrying costs (t ∈ H1(S)), we should produce all the demand in that period. On the contrary,
if the period is such that production and production-backlogging carrying costs are greater than
production-inventory carrying ones (t ∈ H2(S)), all the demand should have been produced in
the earlier period with minimum cost (kh) and inventory carried until that period (t). Finally, in
a period where production and production-inventory carrying costs are greater than production-
backlogging carrying ones (t ∈ H3(S)), all the demand should be produced in the future period
with minimum cost (kb) and backlogging carried until that period (t).
The reader may notice that if the matrices H , B and P are in integer values then the charac-
teristic function of these games is also integer.
The next example illustrates all the results obtained in Section 4.
Example 4.4. Consider the following PI-situation with three periods and three players.
Demand Production Inventory Backlogging
P1 0 2 5 3 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 1
P2 0 8 6 4 2 3 2 0 1 1 3 1
P3 0 6 2 3 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 1
It can be easily checked that for all S ⊆ N , H1(S) = {2}, H2(S) = {3}, H3(S) = {1}, and
c(S) = pS2 dS2 + dS3 (hS23 +pS2 )+ dS1 (bS21 +pS2 ). Hence, the data above gives rise to the game with
characteristic function in the following table:
dS1 d
S
2 d
S
3 p
S
1 p
S
2 p
S
3 h
S
1 h
S
2 h
S
3 b
S
1 b
S
2 b
S
3 c
{1} 0 2 5 3 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 1 7
{2} 0 8 6 4 2 3 2 0 1 1 3 1 28
{3} 0 6 2 3 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 1 8
{1,2} 0 10 11 3 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 1 21
{1,3} 0 8 7 3 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 1 15
{2,3} 0 14 8 3 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 1 22
{1,2,3} 0 16 13 3 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 1 29
The optimal solution set of (DLPI({1,2,3})) is {(y1,1,1)/−1 y1  2}. However, the Owen
set and the core reduces to a singleton: Owen(N,D,H,B,P ) = Core(N, c) = {(7,14,8)}.
Moreover, the game above is not concave since c({1,2})− c({2}) = −7 < c(N)− c({2,3}) = 7.
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Owen set of the PI-situation above reduces to a singleton again. We wonder if every PI-situation
exhibits this property. Next section gives an affirmative answer.
5. Owen point
It is well known that the larger the player set, the more difficult it is to determine the core
of a cost TU-game (i.e. the number of inequalities involved increases rapidly). The goal of this
section is to find a core-allocation for a PI-game which is easy to calculate and satisfies good
properties.
The first result reveals that the Owen set of a PI-situation shrinks to a singleton and provides
an explicit form to compute it.
Theorem 5.1. Let (N,D,H,B,P ) be a PI-situation with D being an integer matrix. Then,
Owen(N,D,H,B,P ) = {(o1, . . . , on)} where, for each i ∈ N,
oi =
∑
t∈H1(N)
pNt d
i
t +
∑
t∈H2(N)
dit
(
pNkh + hNkht
)+ ∑
t∈H3(N)
dit
(
pNkb + bNtkb
)
. (19)
Proof. Take y∗(N), y(N) ∈ O(DLPI(N)), y∗(N) = y(N). Proving that ∑Tt=1 yt (N)dit =∑T
t=1 y∗t (N)dit , it follows oi :=
∑T
t=1 y∗t (N)dit which proves (19).
Taking into account that dNt = 0 if and only if dit = 0 for all i ∈ N, and yt (N) = y∗t (N) if
dNt > 0,
T∑
t=1
[
yt (N) − y∗t (N)
]
dit =
∑
1tT
dNt =0
[
yt (N) − y∗t (N)
]
dit +
∑
1tT
dNt >0
[
yt (N) − y∗t (N)
]
dit = 0.

Every cost allocation o = (oi)i∈N of a PI-game defined in this way is what we call the Owen
point for (N, c). Obviously, the Owen point is a core-allocation. The Owen point, for each
player i, can be interpreted as the cost he/she has to pay when producing at the minimum oper-
ation cost. Hence, we propose the Owen point as an alternative value for PI-games. We note in
passing that if the matrices P , H and B are integers then the core-allocation given by the Owen
point is also in integer values.
The Owen point for the situation given in Example 4.4 is obtained by
o1 = pN2 d12 + d13
(
hN23 + pN2
)+ d11 (bN21 + pN2 )= 7,
o2 = pN2 d22 + d23
(
hN23 + pN2
)+ d21 (bN21 + pN2 )= 14,
o3 = pN2 d32 + d33
(
hN23 + pN2
)+ d31 (bN21 + pN2 )= 8.
Next theorem shows that there is a pmas that realizes the Owen point.
Theorem 5.2. Let (N,D,H,B,P ) be a PI-situation with D being an integer matrix, and (N, c)
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ySi :=
T∑
t=1
y∗t (S)dit .
Then for all S ⊆ N,S = ∅
yS(S) =
∑
i∈S
(
T∑
t=1
y∗t (S)dit
)
=
T∑
t=1
y∗t (S)dSt = c(S),
and for all S ⊆ R ⊆ N , S,R = ∅ and for all i ∈ S,
ySi =
T∑
t=1
y∗t (S)dit 
T∑
t=1
y∗t (R)dit = yRi ,
since y∗t (S) y∗t (R) (a consequence of F(DLPI(R)) ⊆ F(DLPI(S)) and Lemma 3.2 extended
to the coalition S ⊆ N).
Finally, we see that yNi = oi for all i ∈ N. So, the Owen point o can be reached through the
pmas (yS)∅=S⊆N . 
Existence of pmas for the entire class of production-inventory games is important by itself
but in addition has an interesting consequence. It allows us to prove that PI-games are strictly
included in the class of totally balanced games since in general there are totally balanced games
without pmas.
It is also possible to prove the existence of pmas in PI-games using the following analysis:
consider a situation with N players and T time periods, but only 1 out of the |N | × |T | demands
is positive. The player with this demand pays the costs, which obviously decreases if the coali-
tion he belongs to increases. This is a natural pmas (this player is some sort of a veto-player).
Extending this to a general setting by adding |N |×|T | of these games provides a pmas in general.
Another observation, from the proof of the above theorem, is that a pmas for any PI-game can
be built just taking the Owen point of each subgame and gathering all of them as a collection of
vectors.
The Owen point for the game given in Example 4.4 can be reached through the pmas(
(7){1}, (28){2}, (8){3}, (7,14){1,2}, (7,8){1,3}, (14,8){2,3}, (7,14,8){1,2,3}
)
.
In that example the core is a singleton: the Owen point. This is not a general property for
PI-games. Next theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the core of a PI-game
to be a singleton. The following concept is required.
Definition 5.3. Let (N,D,H,B,P ) be a PI-situation with D being an integer matrix. We say that
i ∈ N is an essential player for (N,D,H,B,P ) if there exists at least one period t ∈ {1, . . . , T }
with dN\{i}t > 0 such that y∗t (N) < y∗t (N \ {i}).
The reader may notice that an essential player is the one for which at least one period exists, in
which it is needed by the rest of players in order to produce at a minimum cost a certain demand.
On the other hand, an inessential player i is the one which is unnecessary by the grand coalition
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ing we prove that the core of a PI-game shrinks to the Owen point just only when all players are
inessential for the PI-situation.
Theorem 5.4. Let (N,D,H,B,P ) be a PI-situation with D being an integer matrix and (N, c)
the corresponding PI-game. Then, Core(N, c) = {o} if and only if E = ∅.
Proof. (Only if ) Take (N,D,H,B,P ) a PI-situation with D being an integer matrix and all
players are inessential for it. Then, for all i ∈ N, y∗t (N \ {i}) = y∗t (N) for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T } with
d
N\{i}
t > 0, and y∗t (N \ {i}) y∗t (N) for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T } with dN\{i}t = 0. Hence, c(N \ {i}) =
o(N \ {i}).
Take x ∈ Core(N, c) and recall that o ∈ Core(N, c). Then, for all i ∈ N,c(N) − c(N \ {i}) =
oi  xi and
∑n
i=1 xi =
∑n
i=1 oi. Hence, xi = oi for all i ∈ N . So we can conclude that
Core(N, c) = {o}.
(If ) Suppose that E = ∅. Take j ∈ E , then there exists t∗ ∈ {1, . . . , T } with dN\{j}t∗ > 0 such
that y∗t∗(N) < y∗t∗(N \ {j}). For any period t satisfying the above condition, there exists i ∈
N \ {j} such that dit > 0. It can be checked that for all R ⊂ N \ {j}, i ∈ R it holds y∗t (N) <
y∗t (N \ {j}) y∗t (R). Hence o(R) < c(R).
Define Δ := {R ⊂ N \ {j}: i ∈ R}, 0 < α := minR∈Δ{c(R) − o(R)}, and for all k ∈ N
o∗k =
⎧⎨
⎩
ok k ∈ N \ {i, j},
oi + α k = i,
oj − α k = j .
(20)
It can be easily checked that o∗ ∈ Core(N, c). Hence, we can conclude that Core(N, c) =
{o}. 
The above proof sheds light onto the structure of the core. If there exists at least one essential
player, the rest of players compensate him for cooperation by reducing the cost when producing
at minimum production cost according to (20). On the contrary, if no player is essential the unique
core-allocation is the one given by the cost generated when producing at minimum production
cost.
We would like to conclude this section positioning the Owen point in comparison with other
well-known allocations in cooperative game theory. Although due to space requirements we do
not include examples in the paper, the interested reader can find examples supporting our claims
in the working paper by Guardiola et al. (2004). First of all, in the class of PI-games the Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953) is not, in general, a core allocation. Moreover, even in those cases when
Shapley value belongs to the core it does not have to coincide with the Owen point. Finally, we
point out that the Owen point does not coincide either with the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969).
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented a model of cooperation among several firms arising from
dynamic production-inventory situations with discrete demand and finite planning horizon. In
this model any group of firms can agree to cooperate because fair allocations of operation costs
which are stable always exist. In this sense none of the firms would have an incentive to leave
the group. From among all the above fair allocations, we propose the Owen point: the allocationPlease cite this article in press as: L.A. Guardiola et al., Production-inventory games: A new class of totally balanced
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appealing since it can be calculated in polynomial time and, moreover, it can be reached through
a pmas.
We note in passing that incorporating selling prices to the considered model would have not
modified the structure of the problem, so that all the conclusions would have been the same.
We would like to finish these remarks mentioning some additional topics for further research
on the cooperation model considered in this paper:
(1) to find out descriptions of the structure of the core,
(2) axiomatic characterizations of the Owen point,
(3) alternative allocation schemes, and
(4) other forms of cooperation and/or competition, as well as models with concave cost func-
tions.
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